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Introduction 
This article proposes that the European Union (EU) should consider re-introducing the 
Passenger Name Record Directive from 2011. The Directive did not get through the 
legislative process due to concerns over how it would cultivate a surveillance society and fail 
to adequately protect data protection along with an individual’s privacy. In relation to 
terrorist activity, events have moved on since 2011 posing an increased threat to the national 
security of EU Member States, in particular the rise of the terrorist group Islamic State. By 
examining the current terrorist threat the EU faces, this paper argues that a different version 
of the 2011 directive on Passenger Name Records should be introduced in a form that does 
not compromise the EU’s commitment to data protection and rights to privacy of EU citizens. 
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, European Parliament MEP’s have 
already heard proposals for an amended draft of the Passenger Name Records Directive be 
introduced. The proposal in this article challenges the content of that draft by recommending 
that a new Directive applies solely to terrorism investigations allowing only a very short, 
limited period of retention of the data by national security and a counter-terrorism policing 
agencies. To prevent data mining, it is recommended that the information contained in 
passenger name records is checked only against terrorist suspects already on intelligence 
systems.   
The Current Terrorist Threat  
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 The civil war in Syria and the inability to control and defend its north western 
territory by the Iraqi government has allowed a political vacuum to exist enabling Islamist 
groups, in particular Islamic State (formerly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and also referred to as 
ISIL) and the Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra Front to flourish and become more powerful 
in the region. These groups do not just pose a threat to the security of the Syrian/Iraqi region, 
they pose a threat to the security of nations around the world, especially EU Member States. 
The threat is posed on two fronts. Firstly from the number of EU Member State citizens who 
have gone to countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen to join Islamist terror groups 
with those citizens becoming radicalised to such a degree they see their home state as an 
enemy. In this context, the threat to security is these citizens are more likely to plan and carry 
out terrorist attacks in their home state. The second threat posed by these groups is how their 
skilful use of social media is used to radicalise EU citizens and influence them to carry out 
terrorist attacks in their home EU Member State. 
The rise in number of EU citizens joining the group to fight in Syria and Iraq 
The terrorist group causing most concern to the threat of national security within the 
EU Member States is Islamic State. Islamic State was originally the group AQI that split from 
Jabhat al-Nusra Front in 2013. A predominantly Sunni jihadist terror group, 2014 witnessed 
the rise and increased terrorist activity of Islamic State (Nance 2015 pp. 311-312). In January 
2015 it was estimated that up to 5,000 European citizens travelled to Syria and Iraq to join 
Islamic State to fight for their cause. Regarding this figure, what is of concern is this could be 
a conservative estimate (BBC News 2015). From September 2014 to January 2015 there has 
been a significant increase in the number of citizens from EU Member States that have 
travelled to join Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. From just four of the EU’s Member States, in 




France – September 2014 900 citizens, January 2015 an increase of 500 to 1,400 
(Mezzfiorie 2014); 
UK – September 2014 approximately 400 citizens, January 2015 an increase of 200 to 
600 (Murray 2014); 
Germany – September 2014 320 citizens, January 2015 there was an increase of 280 to 
600 (Mamighano 2014); 
Belgium – September 2014 350 citizens, January 2015 that figure increased to 450 (the 
highest number in the ratio per head of the population of any of the EU Member States) 
(BBC News 2015). 
   
This alarming increase in the number of citizens who have gone to Syria and Iraq to 
fight with Islamic state has led the director of Europol (the EU’s policing agency), Rob 
Wainwright to warn of the security gap facing EU policing agencies as they try to monitor 
online communications of terrorist suspects which is compounded by the fact that by being in 
Syria and Iraq these suspects are effectively out of reach (BBC News 2015a). More recently 
Rob Wainwright has revealed further concerns of the difficulty security and policing agencies 
face in monitoring electronic communications used by terrorists. He said that hidden areas of 
the Internet and encrypted communications are making it harder to monitor terrorist suspects, 
adding that Tech firms should consider the impact sophisticated encryption software has on 
law enforcement. Wainwright mentioned how this can range from blogging websites to social 
media sources such as Twitter where he revealed that Islamic State is believed to have up to 
50,000 different Twitter accounts, tweeting up to 100,000 messages a day (BBC News 2015f). 
In September 2014 three Dutch citizens were arrested in the Netherlands on suspicion 
of recruiting for Islamic State with the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service 
calling that support for Islamic State in the Netherlands amounts to a few hundred followers 
and several sympathisers (Aljazzera 2014). The danger of having Islamic State followers, 
even where there are small numbers, in the EU’s Member States was evident in May 2014 
when four people were killed at the Jewish Museum in Brussels (BBC News 2014) by an 
Islamic State militant, Muhdi Nemmouche (Rawlinson 2014).  
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 Mainly due to the threat Islamic State pose, on the 29
th
 August 2014 the UK terrorist 
threat was raised by the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre from substantial to severe as 
terrorist attacks are now highly likely (BBC News 2014a). The Monday following the raising 
of the UK’s terrorist threat level, the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron announced the UK 
would introduce a terrorism related measures that included a proposal that airlines be forced 
to hand over more information about passengers travelling to and from conflict zones (BBC 
News 2014b). From that announcement travel measures related to aviation, maritime and rail 
security were included in the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (sections 22-25 
and Schedule 5) that was more specifically applicable only to authority-to-carry schemes. 
Regarding passengers, the Act only applies to individuals who are suspected or assessed to 
pose a threat to the security of the aircraft, ship or train or individuals who are using invalid 
travel documentation and these provisions are not directly related to passenger name records 
(Home Office 2015).  
Where access to passenger name records data would be an asset to Member State 
security services and counter-terrorism policing agencies are in circumstances relating to 
those reported by Europol who in their 2014 T-SAT Report stated that Syria and Turkey are 
the main destinations of choice for travellers seeking to joined armed terror groups due to the 
accessibility of their borders to Islamic state gained territory (Europol 2014 p.23). In the 
report Europol state that specific organised facilitation networks are likely to be involved in 
ensuring a smooth transport transition for those wishing to travel and join radical fighting 
groups such as Islamic State, as well as other groups such as Jabhat al- Nusra Front, citing the 
example of Sharia4Belgium as one such network (Europol 2014 p.24).  
The Threat of Islamic State/Jabhat al-Nusra Front Influenced terrorist attacks in EU 
Member States: Post Paris 2015 Attacks 
5 
 
 On January 7
th
 2015 Europe received a stark wake-up call to the threat Islamist groups
 pose to the Continent’s sovereign states with the attack on the offices of the French 
satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo where Cherif and Said Kouachi killed twelve people, ten 
of the staff of the magazine and two police officers who were protecting the building. These 
two brothers were French citizens of Algerian descent who, after travelling to an Al Qaeda 
training camp in the Yemen were influenced by the Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Wilsher 2015), where the group subsequently claimed 
responsibility for the attack (Saul 2015). On the 8
th
 January 2015 Amedy Coulibaly, who 
claimed association with Islamic State, killed a policewoman and injured another police 
officer outside a metro station in Paris. On the 9
th
 January he took a number of people 
hostage in a Jewish Supermarket in Paris, killing four of the hostages before the French 
police stormed the building (Berger 2015). Both he and the Kouachi brothers were killed by 
the French police following two respective siege situations (BBC News 2015).  
 Paris was not the sole focus of Islamist terrorist activity in Europe during January 
2015. In Brussels the Belgian police executed a warrant at premises suspected to be used by 
an Islamist terrorist cell that contained citizens who had returned from fighting with Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq. While two of the suspects were killed by the Belgian police during the 
raid, five were arrested for terrorist related offence where the terrorist cell’s targets were a 
Belgian police station and police officers (BBC News 2015c). The investigation led to 
connections in Greece where the Greek police arrested several people linked to the Belgian 
terror plot. In addition to this the Greek police were also searching for Abdelhamid Abaaoud, 
a Brussels resident of Moroccan origin who is believed to be a ringleader of a jihadi cell 
based in Belgium and who has links to Al Qaeda, possibly Jabaht al-Nusra Front (BBC News 
2015d). In the same week in January 2015, German police arrested two men in Berlin on 
suspicion of recruiting individuals to join Islamic State in Syria and for raising finances for 
6 
 
the group (Connelly 2015). During this period a UK citizen, Imran Khawaja was convicted 
and received a prison sentence at the Old Baily Court in London for preparing acts of 
terrorism, attending a terrorist training camp in Syria, receiving training there and for 
possessing firearms. Khawaja had spent six months in Syria fighting with Islamic state and 
using social media sources faked his own death in an attempt to return to the UK (BBC News 
2015e). More recently another concern for EU Member States has been the number of young 
people and families flying to Turkey in the hope of crossing the border into Syria to join 
Islamic State, many of whom appear to have been radicalised to the group’s cause prior to 
leaving their home state (BBC News 2015g). 
 From just the terrorist activities and investigations among the EU Member States from 
the 7
th
 to the 20
th
 January 2015 one can see how real and lethal the terrorist threat to Europe 
is from international terrorist groups such as Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra Front. As at 
the time of writing, the fact that over 5,000 EU citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to 
fight alongside these groups, it is submitted that what Europe has witnessed in the last nine 
months is only the tip of the iceberg. As more of these citizens return to Europe, the potential 
for attacks will increase and maintaining surveillance on individuals who have been identified 
as a terrorist risk will add further to the strain EU Member States security services and 
counter-terrorism police officers are already facing as they try to prevent acts of terrorism and 
keep EU citizens safe. The potential result of the security gap the Europol Director stated is 
as the head of the UK’s national security agency MI5, Andrew Parker pointed out when he 
gave the stark warning that currently it is impossible to prevent every type of terrorist attack 
(Security Service MI5 2015). Having an EU passenger Name Record directive would go 
some way to preventing potential attacks and keeping EU citizens safe. 
The EU’s Directive on Passenger Name Records 2011/0023 
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In February 2011 the European Commission produced a proposal for a directive on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (2011/0023). At the time of its publication 
the explanation memorandum covered issues as to why the directive was needed by agencies 
involved in investigating terrorism and serious crime where a comparison was drawn between 
PNR and aircraft passenger information (API). The main difference between PNR’s and 
API’s is the detail of information they contain. PNR’s contain the following information: 
1. Name of Passenger; 
2. Contact details for the travel agent or airline office; 
3. Ticketing details; 
4. Itinerary of at least one segment, which must be the same for all passengers listed; 
5. Name of person providing the information or making the booking; 
6. Passenger gender; 
7. Passport details (includes nationality, passport number and date of passport expiry); 
8. Date and place of birth; 
9. Billing information; 
10. Form of payment (include debit/credit card details); 
11. Contact details (potentially include landline/mobile phone numbers); 
12. Frequent flyer data; and 
13. Vendor remarks kept by the airline (International Civil Aviation Organisation (2010) 
Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data Quebec: International Civil 
Aviation organisation).  
This is far more extensive information compared to API’s that only contains a passenger’s 
name, date of birth, gender, nationality and passport details and this limitation was recognised 
by the European Commission in the explanatory memorandum to the 2011 PNR Directive 
saying: 
‘API data does not enable law enforcement authorities to conduct an assessment 
of passengers and therefore do not facilitate the detection of hitherto “unknown” 
criminals or terrorists’ [my emphasis] (2011/0023 Directive p.7). 
While API is useful in terrorism investigations at port and border controls for investigating 
officers to ascertain who is on a flight list that can be checked against suspects already 
contained within intelligence systems, this information is limiting. It is limiting when 
investigating officers are assessing the wider picture at the stage of the investigation when 
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they are trying to ascertain details of unknown associates of known terrorist suspects that post 
a threat to security. This is the main point being made by the European Commission 
regarding how restrictive API’s are. The additional information contained in the Directive, 
such as who made the booking or contact details and methods of payment can be cross-
checked making it easier for investigating officers to see if there is a connection with terrorist 
suspects in intelligence systems. As stated above, Europol have already found that there are 
groups known to security and counter-terrorism policing that are facilitating the travel of 
unknown individuals who may not be on intelligence systems that in intelligence circles are 
referred to as clean-skins. However if from the PNR data a link is made, this will greatly 
assist the agencies investigating terrorism. The fact that PNR data is an important intelligence 
tool is also recognised in the PNR Directive’s explanatory memorandum (Directive 
2011/0023 Explanatory Memorandum p.8). 
Key Provisions in the 2011 PNR Directive   
While clearly stating the scope of use of PNR data was the prevention, detection and 
prevention of terrorist offences and serious crime (Directive 2011/0023 article 9) the 
Directive recommended that Member States identified competent authorities to process the 
PNR data issued from Passenger Information Units (Directive 2011/0023, article 5). It is 
clear that no decision should be taken by the competent authority on the basis of a person’s 
race or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical belief, political opinion, trade union 
membership, health or sexual life. One concern with the Directive related to data retention 
was the protection of personal data and the transfer of data to third countries. In essence, the 
proposed period of detention of data by competent authority was 30 days, with the Passenger 
Information Unit to retain the data for 5 years (Directive 2011/0023 article 9). The protection 
of the data should be covered by the Council Framework Decision on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
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matters (FD 2008/977/JHA). The data subject has the right to expect the competent authority 
to fulfil their duties regarding their duties under the Framework Decision (article 18) and that 
includes the right for the data subject to have a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights 
guaranteed to them by the applicable national law (FD 2008/997/JHA article 20). Where the 
PNR data is transferred to a third country, the Framework Decision makes it clear that the 
third country must have an adequate level of protection of the intended data processing (FD 
2008/997/JHA article 14). 
  
Concerns Regarding the PNR Directive  
In 2011 the European Parliament expressed concerns that the proposed method of 
automatically processing PNR data using fact based pre-determined assessment criteria was 
very wide and thought that such an assessment should never result in , ‘…profiling on the 
basis of sensitive data’ (Directive 2011/0023 Memorandum p.10). Compared to when the 
PNR Directive was first proposed recent activities from terrorist groups such as Islamic State 
demonstrates how the terrorist threat has escalated in severity since 2011 and is not only real 
but is potentially dangerous to the right to life of EU citizens. This is important as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor questioned if the PNR Directive was necessary and 
proportionate. His main concern was the collection of data of innocent persons. It was 
insufficient protection of the individual’s data privacy that led to his criticism of the Directive 
proposal that he saw as contributing towards a surveillance society (Directive 2011/0023 
Memorandum p.10). 
Concerns Over a Surveillance Society  
In April 2013, the Committee on Civil Liberties of the European Parliament (LIBE) saw the 
PNR Directive being too wide and consequently refused to agree for the need of the Directive. 
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The concerns mainly cantered on Passenger Information Unit as having the potential to refuse 
to erase a person’s data even if they are not suspected of a crime and the Committee had a 
concern the Directive left it open to authorities to carry out offender profiling on individuals 
who matched certain behaviour (The European Citizen 2014). 2013 was a year where fears of 
a surveillance society were confirmed following the revelations by the former US National 
Security Agency (NSA) employee, Edward Snowdon on the practices of the NSA and the 
UK’s General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in particular Operation PRISM and 
the bulk surveillance of electronic forms of communication and telephone use, some of which 
was unauthorised (Greenwald 2014 pp.33-42). The shock waves of the NSA’s actions 
reverberated around the world, more so when it was revealed that politicians in the EU’s 
Member States were also spied on by the NSA, in particular the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel (Greenwald 2014 p. 141). As Greenwald (the Guardian newspaper journalist 
Snowden passed the NSA documentation onto) says, what is more remarkable are the 
revelations that the NSA was spying on millions of European citizens adding; 
‘…in addition to foreign leaders the United states … also spied extensively on 
international organisations such as the United Nations to gain a diplomatic 
advantage.’ (Greenwald 2014 p142) 
It is understandable why there is such a concern when recommendations that further 
surveillance powers be granted to national security and policing agencies, yet a balance has to 
be drawn between the needs of protecting the interests of security within the EU’s Member 
States and the rights of individual citizens. 
 European Union law is clear that personal data is to be protected. Article 16 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that everyone has the right to 
the protection of personal data concerning them (TFEU C326/55 Article 16(1)) and the 
European Parliament and the Council must act in accordance with ordinary legislative 
procedure that will lay down rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the 
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processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, office and agencies when carrying 
out activities that fall with the scope of EU law (TFEU article 16(2)) as does article 39 in the 
Treaty of Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also is clear that 
everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them (2000/C 364/01 
Article 8(1)) 8(2)). In that right it states, ‘…data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law’ (2000/C 364/01 Article 8(2)) [My emphasis]. This is in addition to the respect 
the state must have for the right of a person to their private and family life in both the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01 Article 7) and the Council of 
Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 8). Article 8 of the ECHR 
does allow for the state to interfere with the right to privacy where it is under an act 
proscribed by law and it is necessary in democratic state when it is in the interests of national 
security or to prevent crime or disorder. 
 These protections are upheld in the agreements the European Union has with the 
United States regarding the transfer of PNR (Agreement between the United States of 
America and the European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name records to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security 17434/11) and the agreement with Australia 
of PNR data (Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger name records (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service 10093/11). In the agreement between the US and the EU it states 
the US will confirm that effective administrative, civil and criminal enforcement measures 
are available under US law for privacy incidents and the US Department of Homeland 
Security will take disciplinary action against persons responsible for inappropriate use of the 
privacy conditions (17434/11 article 5(6)). It also says in the agreement that the Department 
of Homeland Security will inform the relevant EU authorities of cases of privacy incidents 
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involving PNR of EU citizens (17434/11 article 5(4)). Similar provisions relating to data 
security and integrity also are present in the agreement between the EU and Australia 
(10093/11 article 9) including the separate storing of EU citizens’ PNR data and it is only 
stored for the purpose of matching with intelligence data Australian authorities have on 
persons suspected of being involved in terrorism or serious crime (10093/11 article 9(1)(a)). 
The EU has understandably and rightly taken a strict approach as to how intelligence and 
citizens’ personal data is handled and dealt with by state authorities. This is provided for in 
the European Commission’s overview of information management (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of information management 
in the area of freedom, security and justice COM(2010)385 final) which concludes saying: 
‘Adopting … a principled approach to policy development and evaluation is 
expected to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of current and future 
instruments in a manner that fully respects fundamental rights.’ (Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of 





This is seen in the current Directive regarding the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences (Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals data 2012/0010 (COD)) that is expected to be introduced in 2016. 
New EU Data Protection Regulation and Directive  
The EU was looking to amend the data protection provisions it currently has in place prior to 
the Snowden revelations, however the EU is introducing changes to take effect by 2016 at the 
latest that will tighten up EU citizens’ data protection, in particular regarding data exchange 
with third countries. The two pieces of legislation proposed are: 
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1. Personal data protection regulation: processing and free movement of data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) 2012/0011 COD; 
2. Personal data protection directive: processing of data for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties 
and free movement of data, 2012/0010 COD 
The regulation will have an impact in the private sector as businesses will have to set up new 
processes to facilitate the rights of citizens to access information held on them. Regarding the 
directive, the transfer of data to a third country/international organisation will only occur if it 
is for the same purpose as the directive and that organisation is a public authority in a state 
that provides a proper level of data protection within a country where appropriate safeguards 
are established in a legally binding instrument (article 33). 
 Post the January 2015 terrorism events in Europe, the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs 
Commission has brought back on the EU’s legislative agenda a proposal for blanket 
collection and storage of passenger name record data for up to five years on all records of 
passengers flying in and out of Europe. It is not a given that the plans will become legislation 
in the EU as the vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, Jan 
Philip Albrecht sees the plans as an affront, in particular to the EU’s main court, the 
European Court of Justice decision in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de 
Prrteccion de Datos (APED) Case C-131/12, which held in 2014 that data retention without 
any link to risk or suspicion is not proportionate. For Albrecht a plan to blanketly retain all 
passenger data would be open to a breach of fundamental rights (Travis 2015).  
A Proposed New Version of a PNR Directive   
While the Directive 2012/0010 (COD) is expansive in its coverage of criminal activity it 
is submitted that a separate directive is required to deal with the transfer of PNR. Building on 
the 2011 draft PNR Directive, a new draft text on an EU system for the use of PNR data was 
tabled by lead Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR, UK) 
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that was discussed in the LIBE Committee on 26 February 2015.  An evaluation of the 
necessity and proportionality of the proposal in the face of current security threats, its scope 
(list of offences covered), retention periods, the inclusion or exclusion of intra-EU flights, the 
connection with the on-going data protection reform, as well as the consequences of the EU 
Court of Justice judgement annulling the 2006 data retention directive, were among the issues 
discussed by MEPs. The 2011 Commission proposal would require more systematic 
collection, use and retention of PNR data on passengers taking “international” flights (those 
entering the EU from, or leaving it for, a third country), and would therefore have an impact 
on the rights to privacy and data protection. 
The changes proposed by Timothy Kirkhope in the revised draft report include: 
1. The scope of the proposal is narrowed to cover terror offences and serious 
"transnational" crime (the list of specific offences includes, for instance, trafficking 
in human beings, child pornography, trafficking in weapons, munitions and 
explosives); 
2. Sensitive data to be permanently deleted no later than 30 days from the last 
receipt of PNR containing such data by competent authorities. Other data will 
continue to be masked after 30 days; 
3. The inclusion of intra-EU flights (not initially included by the Commission, but 
the Council of the European Union favours the inclusion of internal EU flights); 
4. 100% coverage of flights (the Commission text proposed to reach 100% 
coverage of international flights in gradual steps); 
5. Access to the PNR data continues to be allowed for five years for terrorism, but 
is reduced to four years for serious crime; 
6. Each EU member state should appoint a data protection supervisory officer; 
7. Persons who operate security controls, who access and analyse the PNR data, 
and operate the data logs, must be security cleared, and security trained; 
8. References are made in the text to the EU Court of Justice judgment on data 
retention and to the current EU data protection rules; and, 
9. The period for member states to transpose the directive is extended from two to 
three years (given the specific technological and structural demands of setting up an 
EU PNR system for each member state).  
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It is understandable why the revised draft included serious transnational crime as well 
as terrorism as offences such as the trafficking of human beings causes great suffering 
to those who are being trafficked. However, the trafficking in weapons, munitions and 
explosives can be linked to terrorism investigations. The wider the inclusion of offences 
thereby giving greater access to PNR data, there is the potential for wider data mining 
and profiling of EU citizens. The advantage of linking PNR data access to terrorism 
investigations minimises potential abuse in the collection and retention of PNR data. By 
having tighter control in the data’s access by only allowing security and counter-
terrorism policing agencies to use the data to link passenger connections with known 
terrorist or terrorist organisations currently on intelligence systems again minimises the 
potential for offender profiling. 
Incorporating some of the points in the revised draft and building on it, it is 
submitted that consideration be given to the following points, which is more likely to 
conform to data privacy and protection law and avert fears of a surveillance society. 
While keeping from Kirkhope’s revised draft that each EU Member State appoint a data 
protection supervisory officer, persons who have access to PNR data are security 
cleared and have training, and, that in the Directive reference is made to EU Court of 
Justice and current EU data protection rules, a PNR Directive proposal includes: 
1. Any amended Directive is solely related to terrorism investigations; 
2. The Directive only applies to targeted flights to and from states that border or are 
terrorist conflict zones; 
3. The PNR data is only held by competent authorities (who would be Member States’ 
national security agencies and Counter-Terrorism Policing Departments); 
4. Requests for PNR data on applicable flights is carried out through and by Europol on 
behalf of the respective Member State competent authority requesting the data; 
5. It is necessary that all Member States collect, process and exchange PNR data to 
avoid security gaps as this will contribute towards the security of the EU; 
6. All PNR data is handled in accordance with the provisions of  Article 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 16 of the Treaty on the 




7. The data is pulled from the PNR data solely for matching purposes in relation to 
terrorism intelligence already in the possession of the Member States’ competent 
authorities. The data cannot be requested for sole purpose offender profiling, thereby 
preventing data mining. 
 
In addition to these suggestions, the sections in Kirkhope’s revised draft referring to 
serious crime is omitted and by targeting flights to or states bordering terrorist conflict 
zones rather than all flights, this reduces the concern over data mining by Member 
States’ competent authorities. The flights that are targeted will be based on intelligence, 
in particular those recognised by Europol from its intelligence source, Schengen 
Information System II. By having requests for PNR data through Europol will help to 
enhance Europol’s role as they have the capability to organise Joint Investigation teams 
as well as negotiate intelligence exchange treaties with third countries outside the EU. 
The PNR data targeting could be fluid to match travel patterns as countries are 
identified as destinations for those wanting to travel and join terrorist groups. The main 
aim of counter-terrorism investigations is to prevent terrorist acts from happening and 
ensuring that EU Member States’ citizens are safe. Such a proposal would enhance this 
capability and it is submitted this proposal is not only necessary but is also a 
proportionate legislative response to the terrorist threat the EU faces.   
Conclusion 
 Following the Snowden revelations in 2013 regarding the electronic 
surveillance practices of the US’ NSA and the UK’s GCHQ, it is understandable there 
is a degree of caution when legislation is considered in granting further surveillance and 
data gathering powers to national security and policing agencies. This is certainly the 
situation for EU bodies when it was revealed that EU Member State leaders and 
citizens were targeted by the NSA and GCHQ. As outlined, the terrorist threat is a 
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constantly evolving issue and the current threat, especially from Islamist terror groups 
is severe. In just the early months of 2015 EU Member States have suffered the 
devastating effects of terrorist attacks in Paris (January 2015) and Copenhagen 
(February 2015). This is in addition to the Member States counter-terrorism agencies, 
supported by Europol, preventing terrorist attacks during this period. When senior 
figures of security and policing agencies are openly expressing their concerns over their 
respective agency’s capability to consistently prevent attacks under the current 
surveillance related legal framework, these expression should not be ignored. As 
covered, with the ever increasing number of EU citizens flying to or returning from 
countries bordering states containing Islamist terror groups’ bases, an introduction of a 
PNR Directive would go some way to aid security and counter-terrorism policing 
agencies in identifying individuals who may pose a security threat. In addition to the 
proposals for the data protection Regulations and Directives that will be introduced in 
2016, the EU already has in place legal provisions to protect personal data. The 
recommendation submitted here of a new PNR Directive that is applicable only to 
terrorism related activity, along with minimal data retention and intelligence analysis 
linked to suspects already on intelligence systems would help to protect personal data 
as well as going some way to aiding those agencies’ investigations into acts of 
terrorism. Enhancing the capability of preventing terrorist acts enhances further EU 
Member States’ agencies capability of protecting EU citizens, especially in protecting 
their right to life. The right to life is just as important as the right to privacy.  
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